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This Article builds upon prior empirical findings on the prevalence of pyramids and focuses
on the financing subsidies derived through the internal capital markets of pyramids–particularly
through affiliations with financial institutions. Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the
relevant literature and the role that pyramids can play in separating ownership and voting rights.
Part II describes the phenomenon by which the financing advantages derived by firms with finan-
cial affiliates, often non-bank financial institutions (“NBFIs”), results in a distortion of the market
that contributes to pyramid expansion, thereby exacerbating the risk of minority shareholder ex-
propriation. Part III then proposes a regulatory structure that could help reduce this distortion,
drawing upon a recent EU Directive on supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates.
Part IV uses the example of Korea to specifically describe how the subsidization provided by
NBFIs within business groups can distort the market and lead to expropriation. Finally, Part V
explains how the proposed regulatory structure could be concretely applied in Korea to address
this distortion.
ARTICLES
ADDRESSING THE INCENTIVE FOR
EXPROPRIATION WITHIN BUSINESS




In their highly influential empirical study of corporate own-
ership patterns around the world, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer ("LLS") demonstrated that
the most commonly observed ownership structure worldwide is
not the classic Berle and Means model of widely dispersed own-
ership, but that of a controlling shareholder which simultane-
ously manages the firm and exercises control in excess of its cash
flow rights.' They also discovered that the pyramid ownership
structure is the single most commonly used mechanism for al-
lowing controlling shareholders to achieve voting rights in ex-
cess of their ownership rights.2 Their study confirmed that the
separation of ownership and control in concentrated ownership
structures results in tension between controlling and minority
shareholders (and not between managers and dispersed share-
* The chaebol are Korean conglomerates. For further detail, see infra notes 96-122
and accompanying text. For convenience, this Article refers to the Republic of Korea
(South Korea) as "Korea."
** Mr. Hale received hisJ.D. from Columbia Law School and currently works as an
attorney in Washington, D.C. He wishes to thank the Korea Foundation for its financial
assistance on this project while he was in residence at Columbia Law School. This Arti-
cle reflects only the views of the author.
1. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54J. Fin. 471, 472
(1999) [hereinafter Corporate Ownership Around the World] (finding that over one-fourth
of the firms within the twenty-seven wealthy countries they studied were set up within
pyramids and suggesting that the corresponding figure for firms worldwide is likely
higher since poor countries display more highly concentrated ownership than the
wealthy economies in their sample); id. at 474 (stating that controlling shareholders in
most large companies "have control rights in firms in excess of their cash flow rights,
largely through the use of pyramids").
2. See id. at 474, 500 ("Through pyramids, more so than through high voting rights
shares, controlling shareholders acquire power disproportionate to their cash flow
rights."); see also infta notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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holders), and further underscored the corporate governance
dangers resulting from controlling shareholders which are able
to maintain voting control over firms even without substantial
direct ownership.' In the words of LLS, such controlling share-
holders "have the power to expropriate minority shareholders
and an interest in so doing."4
Using the corporate environment of Korea as an example,
this Article builds upon LLS's empirical findings on the preva-
lence of pyramids and focuses on the financing subsidies derived
through the internal capital markets of pyramids-particularly
through affiliations with financial institutions. It contends that
eradicating the private benefits reaped through this subsidiza-
tion would remove a powerful ingredient of pyramid expansion,
and proposes a legal solution that borrows from a recent Euro-
pean Union ("EU") Directive regulating financial conglomer-
ates.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the relevant
literature and the role that pyramids can play in separating own-
ership and voting rights. Part II describes the phenomenon by
which the financing advantages derived by firms with financial
affiliates, often non-bank financial institutions ("NBFIs"), 5 re-
sults in a distortion of the market that contributes to pyramid
3. See Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 1, at 511.
4. See id. As a policy suggestion for reducing this expropriation, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer ("LLS") echoed the conclusions of an earlier empirical study
they co-authored with Robert Vishny. See id. (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determi-
nants of External Finance, 52J. Fin 1131 (1997)). That is, LLS argued that because con-
trolling shareholders unchecked by legal rules have a greater ability to expropriate mi-
nority shareholders, better investor protection would lead to greater investor confi-
dence and thus result in a greater incidence of firms with widely diffused ownership
structures. Their conclusion has spawned a debate in academic journals which this
Article does not attempt to join. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-
Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (2001) (arguing that the correlation be-
tween strong capital markets and certain legal protections is partly explained by social
norms); Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Finance: Cultural Dimension of Corporate
Governance Laws (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=267190 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (arguing that differences in cultural values help
explain the correlation); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233
(2002) (arguing that strong corporate governance laws do little to protect minority
shareholders against poor managerial decision-making, and thus concentrated owner-
ship persists in countries with strong investor protection because, if control were fully
separated from ownership, agency costs resulting from mismanagement (in the form of
lower share value) would be too high, and because concentrated ownership already
reduces agency costs of poor decision-making to an acceptable level).
5. In this paper, the term "non-bank financial institutions" ("NBFIs") is meant to
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expansion, thereby exacerbating the risk of minority share-
holder expropriation. Part III then proposes a regulatory struc-
ture that could help reduce this distortion, drawing upon a re-
cent EU Directive on supplementary supervision of financial
conglomerates. Part IV uses the example of Korea to specifically
describe how the subsidization provided by NBFIs within busi-
ness groups can distort the market and lead to expropriation,
and Part V explains how the proposed regulatory structure could
be concretely applied in Korea to address this distortion. Part VI
concludes.
I. PYRAMIDAL OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND THEIR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS
A. Theories of Expropriation
A large body of literature has pointed out that concentrated
ownership often improves corporate governance when certain key
conditions are met6the most important of which being the
controlling shareholder's exercise of voting rights in parallel
with cash-flow rights.7 Furthermore, it is recognized that a move
toward more diffused ownership often exacerbates agency
problems, since it often results simply in a controlling share-
holder maintaining control with even fewer cash-flow rights.8
Path dependence theorists like Lucian Arye Bebchuck and Mark
include insurance companies and merchant banks, as well as investment trusts and se-
curities companies.
6. See generally Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Owner-
ship: Causes and Consequences, 93J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985); Clifford G. Holderness &
Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Companies, 20 J. FIN
ECON. 317 (1988); Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
7. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph McCahery, Comparative Corporate Govern-
ance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 213 (1999) (citing Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, The Financial Structure of
the Firm and the Problem of Control, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 286 (1989)); Rafael La Porta et al.,
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57J. FIN. 1147 (2002). While the term "corpo-
rate governance" can be associated with both the internal control apparatuses (i.e. the
ability of minority investors and independent directors to check management decision-
making), this Article focuses on the ability of certain business structures to avoid market
disciplines-particularly, their ability to gain a financing advantage over competitors.
8. See, e.g., Stijin Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of
Large Shareholders, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2769-70 (2002); Mara Faccio et al., Dividends and Ex-
propriation, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 54 passim (2001); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at
312-30; Todd Mitton, A Cross-firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the East
Asian Financial Crisis, 64J. FIN. ECON. 215, 217-19 (2002).
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J. Roe have pointed out that the success of the diffused owner-
ship model in the United States hardly crowns it as the beacon
for the world to follow,' and RonaldJ. Gilson highlights the cor-
porate governance virtues of concentrated ownership struc-
tures."° While empirical studies suggest that strong investor pro-
tection can help promote robust capital markets1 and that weak
investor protection generally leads to concentrated ownership, 12
neither of these findings suggest that concentrated ownership
structures necessarily lead to poor corporate governance. The
sky has not fallen in countries like Germany, for example, where
the largest business groups are often controlled by families. Nor
do companies in the United States with large block-holders trade
at a discount to firms with diffused ownership.1 3
Rather, the main problem observed in concentrated owner-
ship structures is that, when investor protection is low, the
agency benefits derived from concentrated ownership are often
outweighed by the private benefits of control reaped by the con-
trollers. 4 Controlling shareholders often try to entrench them-
selves and extract further private benefits from minority inves-
tors through a process known as "rent protection," and they have
a host of incentives and tools to keep control over their enter-
prises even as their cash-flow rights decrease. 5 Such private ben-
9. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuck & MarkJ. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (arguing that the iden-
tity of the most efficient type of ownership structure for businesses in a given country
might depend on earlier ownership patterns). For more information on "path depen-
dence" theory, see Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for "Historical
Economics," in EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC IDEAS: PAST AND PRESENT
15 (Pierre Garrouste & Stavros loannides eds., 2001).
10. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 Am. J. CoMP. L. 329 (2001).
11. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131
(1997).
12. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59J. FIN. 537, 571-89 (2004).
13. See Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Constraints on Large-Block
Shareholders, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 139, 162-64 (Randall K. Morck
ed., 2000). Mark Roe argues that this phenomenon likely results from the preference
of public shareholders for controlling block-holders when the benefits from reduced
managerial agency costs exceed the private benefits reaped by the controlling share-
holder. See Roe, supra note 4, at 239-40.
14. See Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 A. ECON. REv. 22 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership
and Control (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w7203 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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efits of control are generally larger-and thus more minority
shareholders are expropriated-in countries where concen-
trated ownership structures are widespread and investor protec-
tion is weak. 16 Further, the fact that many business groups are
both managed and controlled by families manifests even greater
agency problems in such countries because families have a
uniquely deep-seated interest in retaining control.1 7
In that light, it is evident that the incentives for such expro-
priation result less from concentrated ownership itself than from
the size of the gap between ownership and voting rights and the
prevailing legal environment.1 That is, if the controlling share-
holder directly owns the majority of cash-flow rights in a firm,
this shareholder is much less likely to transfer resources out of
this firm-or "expropriate"-than a controlling shareholder
who owns only a small percentage of the firm's cash-flow rights
yet exercises control through measures such as a pyramid struc-
ture or cross-shareholding.19 Admittedly, the simple assertion
that greater separation between ownership and voting rights
16. See, e.g., Claessens et al., supra note 8, at 2269-70; Dyck & Zingales, supra note
12, at 540-41; Faccio et al., supra note 8, at 59.
17. See Mike Burkart et al., Family Firms, 58J. FIN. 2167, 2168 (2003) (citing Harold
Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences,
93J POL. ECON. 1155 (1985)). Claessens et al. observed family business groups as the
worst exploiters of the gap between ownership and voting rights when investor protec-
tion is low. See Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian
Corporations, 58J. FIN. ECON. 81, 101, 109 (2000); see also Ronald C. Anderson & David
M. Reeb, Founding Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage, 46 J. L. &
ECON. 653 (2003). Because pyramids are often large, the hereditary entrenchment of
only a few families can often affect hundreds of firms, and Morck et al. and Bianchi et
al. have specifically observed this phenomenon in Canada and Italy, respectively. See
Randall K. Morck et al., Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth, in CON-
CENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 13, at 319, 332; Marcello Bianchi et al.,
Pyramidal Groups and the Separation of Ownership and Control in Italy, in THE CONTROL OF
CORPORATE EUROPE 154, 180 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001).
18. Jensen and Meckling recognized this phenomenon over three decades ago,
and empirical studies have confirmed their prescient theory. See Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 6. See generally Faccio et al., supra note 8 (finding that the tendency of con-
trolling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholder wealth increases as their con-
trol exceeds their ownership rights); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and
Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis? (July 21, 2000) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=237809 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006)) (finding that variables re-
lated to the legal environment, rather than the ownership concentration variable, bet-
ter explain the variation in the value of control benefits).
19. See Bebchuck, supra note 15, at 28-29. The same rings true for family-con-
trolled firms, notwithstanding their general stubbornness in maintaining control. See
Anderson & Reeb, supra note 17, at 653-56.
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leads to greater risk of expropriation risks over simplification be-
cause other factors also make a difference, such as the fluidity of
the takeover market, the robustness of outside monitoring, and
the extent to which controlling families value their reputation in
a given society.2" As will be argued below, however, the ability of
controlling shareholders to exercise control rights in excess of
their voting rights is the most powerful incentive for expropria-
tion, 21 and reducing this incentive should be the first task at
hand.
B. The Structure of Pyramids: Weighing Efficiency Advances
Against Expropriation Concerns
Pyramids are generally comprised of a controlling share-
holder (often a family that also plays a management role) at the
top of the business group, which often lacks significant cash-flow
stakes in all the firms within the pyramid but is able to exercise
control over the entire pyramid through the votes of in-
termediaries.22 That is, the family directly controls a firm, which
in turn controls another firm, which in turn controls another
firm, and at least some of these firms are partially owned by
outside shareholders. In this way, the family is able to access the
cash flow rights of the entire pyramid, including those ostensibly
belonging to minority shareholders, even as it shares ownership
with these shareholders. 23
From a corporate governance standpoint, a key difference
between pyramid ownership structures and diffused ownership
or bank-centered models is the following: pyramid ownership
structures, in which the controlling shareholders generally func-
tion as managers, are generally structured to exclude built-in
monitoring agents save for the voices of oft-disenfranchised mi-
20. Compare Bianchi et al., supra note 17, at 180, with Jonas Agnblad et al., Owner-
ship and Control in Sweden: Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control, in THE CON-
TROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE, supra note 17, at 228, 228.
21. See, e.g., Faccio et al., supra note 8, at 57-59.
22. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual
Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-How Rights,
in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 13, at 295, 298-99. The subject of
pyramid group structures should not be confused with that of so-called pyramid (or
Ponzi) schemes, which this Article does not address.
23. See id. at 298-99.
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nority shareholders farther down the pyramid.2 4  In bank-cen-
tered ownership structures the bank itself fulfills monitoring
functions,25 and reputational intermediaries such as accounting
firms play the monitoring role in firms where ownership is
widely dispersed through strong capital markets. In contrast, the
family at the top of the pyramid is just that-at the top of the
ownership structure-and its control of the votes over the entire
pyramid greatly diminishes the ability of endogenous agents
such as minority shareholders to counteract the family's ability
to expropriate minority shareholder value. 26
24. See S-JIN CHANG, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF KORFAN BUSINESS
GROUPS: THE RISE AND FALL OF CHAEBOLS 174 (2003).
25. A voluminous debate has occurred on whether the bank-centered model or
the U.S. model provides better monitoring of management, and the relative advantages
and disadvantages of each have long been pointed out. Still, there is general agree-
ment that banks do perform at least some beneficial monitoring functions, as do trans-
actional cost intermediaries in the U.S. system. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watch-
ing Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992); John C.
Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitors, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1277 (1991); Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). In the Japanese con-
text, there are a few outliers who put forth the radical suggestion that keiretsu banks
(Japanese bank-centered business conglomerate) do not perform a monitoring func-
tion, and rather, that keiretsu themselves do not even exist and are Marxist figments of
the imagination. See Yoshiro Miwa &J. Mark Ramseyer, The Fable of the Keirestu, and Other
Tales ofJapan We Wish Were True (John M. Olin Ctr., Harv. Univ., Discussion Paper No.
316, 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=263979 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006). Needless to
say, their view is in the minority. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the
Main Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 425
(2002) (explaining the majority view, attributed to the influential theories of Masahiko
Aoki, that keiretsu banks have played a crucial monitoring role).
26. At first glance, the prevalence of pyramid structures around the world may be
somewhat surprising, since other mechanisms exist that allow a family to retain control
over an entire business group with minimal cash-flow rights. Particularly, dual-class
stock seems to be a simpler method of raising external finance through equity while
retaining voting control. Yet, even in those countries where the issuance of dual-class
equity is legal, families often do not fully take advantage of this seemingly simple mech-
anism. The best explanation for this puzzling fact is likely that in countries with low
investor protection, non-voting shares generally incur large discounts from the price of
voting shares, and this discount discourages their use as financing tools. After all, in
countries where minority investors are not well protected, such investors have few
means other than voting to ensure that their interests are well-served. See Nenova, supra
note 18 (finding large discounts on dual class shares in countries with low investor
protection). Other methods of separating control from cash-flow rights are that of cir-
cular and cross-shareholding, but they are not generally used by controlling sharehold-
ers as the main strategy in guaranteeing control over a business group. Not only are
cross-shareholding structures illegal in many countries, but both cross-shareholding or
circular shareholding structures, when used alone, generally place mutual control into
the hands of all of the group's members, rather than the hands of a single controlling
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Another perceived benefit of pyramidal ownership struc-
tures is their efficiency. Building upon Ronald Coase's famous
observation that firms serve to economize on transaction CoStS,
2 7
Oliver E. Williamson was among the first to conduct a serious
study of conglomerates, and his work on the "M-form structure"
is widely cited for the proposition that transaction costs among
divisions of a conglomerate can be reduced through internal re-
source allocation. 28  A great deal of subsequent literature has
highlighted the efficiencies of internal resource allocation
among a conglomerate's diversified firms.29 In particular,
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, as well as Tarun Khanna
and Krishna Palepu, contend that business groups can play valu-
able resource-allocation roles that nascent markets are unable to
fulfill in early stages of economic development.3 ° These bene-
fits, however, tend to dissipate as the economy develops and ex-
ternal sources of capital become more easily accessible, 1 or may
shareholder. Since no single entity holds absolute control over all the others, and since
all of the group's members are dependent on each other, such structures tend to sur-
vive only in societies with unusually high levels of mutual trust (e.g. Japan). Thus, the
much more common function of circular and cross-shareholding is to enhance an al-
ready existing pyramid structure, since such a structure channels control and cash flow
into a single locus of power at the top of the pyramid. See Corporate Ownership Around the
World, supra note 1, at 498-501.
27. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937).
28. "M-form structure" is the terminology used for multidivisional conglomerates.
See OLVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 128 (1975); Oliver E. 'Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, At-
tributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537, 1557-60 (1981) [hereinafter The Modern Corporation: Ori-
gins, Evolution, Attributes]. A similar theory on the efficiency of internal capital markets
in conglomerates is also attributed to Armen Alchian, whose writings predated that of
Williamson. See Armen Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 348, 348-49 (Henry Manne ed.,
1969).
29. See Nathaniel H. Leff, Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in Developing
Countries: The Economic Groups, 4 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 661, 670-72 (1978);
see also Robert H. Gertner et al., Internal Versus External Capital Markets, 109 Q. J. ECON
1211, 1212, 1223-25 (1994); Hyun-Han Shin & Rene M. Stultz, Are Internal Capital Mar-
kets Efficient?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 531, 533 (1998); Jeremy C. Stein, Internal Capital Markets
and the Competitionfor Corporation Resources, 52J. FIN. 111, 116-18 (1997); Rene M. Stultz,
Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (1990).
30. See Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging
Markets?: An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups, 55 J. FIN. 867, 868-69 (2000);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis,
11J. APPLIED FIN. 40, 44-46 (1998).
31. See Khanna & Palepu, supra note 30, at 888; see, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra
note 30, at 46-47.
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disappear altogether in times of financial crisis. 2
On the other side of the coin, a number of theorists have
questioned the efficiency of resource allocation in conglomer-
ates. Michael C. Jensen's "free cash flow" theory posits that con-
glomerate managers with too much money tend to invest it inef-
ficiently, thus exacerbating the agency problem.33 Numerous
economists have highlighted the rent-seeking behavior of con-
glomerate managers with various empirical studies.3 4 Simon
Johnson et al. coined the term "tunneling" to explain the phe-
nomenon by which controlling shareholders have strong incen-
tives to channel profits across firms to those in which they have
higher cash flow rights, whether through outright theft or less
obvious means.35
Furthermore, most observers who address the agency
problems associated with pyramids in particular argue that the
ability of controlling shareholders to exercise control with com-
paratively little ownership results in a huge incentive to expropri-
ate. Luigi Zingales, in his oft-cited study of Italian pyramidal
business groups, found evidence of the phenomenon in his
study of the Milan Stock Exchange. 6 Stijn Claessens et al. and
Mara Faccio et al. observed tunneling among East Asian pyra-
mids,37 while Marianne Bertrand et al. found it in India.3" All in
all, perhaps Lucian Arye Bebchuck et al. summarized it best in
their observation that when "the size of cash-flow rights held de-
creases, the size of agency costs increases, not linearly, but rather
at a sharply increasing rate."3 9
32. See, e.g., Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 141, 142 (2000); Mitton, supra note 8, at 216.
33. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash How, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323-24 (1986).
34. See Claessens et al., supra note 17, at 99-104; Randall Morck et al., Do Manage-
rial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45J. FIN. 31, 46 (1990); see also David S. Scharfstein
& Jeremy C. Stein, The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-seeking and
Inefficient Investment, 55 J. FIN. 2537 (2000).
35. Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 22-23.
36. See generally Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan
Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REv. FIN. STUDIES 125 (1994); see also Bianchi et al., supra
note 17, at 154-56.
37. See Stijn Claessens et al., Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East
Asia (Pol'y Res. Dissemination Ctr., Working Paper No. 2088, 1999); Faccio et al., supra
note 8, at 54-55.
38. See Marianne Bertrand, et al., Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian
Business Groups, 117 Q.J. ECON. 121, 121-22 (2002).
39. See Bebchuck, supra note 22, at 296.
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II. THE FINANCING ROLE OF PYRAMIDAL BUSINESS GROUPS
A. Determinants of Pyramid Expansion
In light of the findings above, one might be tempted to con-
clude that the sole purpose of pyramids is to facilitate the owner-
ship and voting rights gap and the expropriation of sharehold-
ers. However, it is not always the case that pyramids are utilized
to allow controlling shareholders to exercise control rights in
firms significantly above their cash flow rights. For example, it
has been pointed out that pyramids in countries such as Ger-
many, Chile, and Turkey are often controlled by families whose
voting and cash flow stakes in each of the pyramid's firms are
nearly parallel,4 ° and thus the same level of control could have
been achieved even without the use of a pyramid structure. In
some pyramids, the controlling shareholder would own at least a
fifty-one percent equity stake of all the subsidiaries in the pyra-
mid even without the aid of a pyramid structure,41 and these in-
dications tend to contradict the idea that the raison detre of the
pyramid structure is simply to enhance the controlling share-
holder's level of control over the pyramid.
Further negating this theory, even in those countries where
the average gap between the cash flow and voting rights of con-
trolling shareholders is quite large, dual-class shares with differ-
ential voting rights are not used nearly as much as pyramid struc-
tures to achieve this separation even when the issuance of such
shares is legal.42 If controlling shareholders were simply inter-
ested in keeping control while reaping financial benefits, they
would issue non-voting shares at or near the level allowed by law
to raise the maximal amount of capital possible while retaining
control, regardless of whether the price of these shares were dis-
40. See Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and
Family Business Groups, 61J. FIN. (forthcoming Dec. 2006) (manuscript at 30-31) [here-
inafter A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership], http://ssrn.com/abstract=721801)(last visited
Oct. 3, 2006).
41. See id. at 24. These types of pyramids are quite benign from a corporate gov-
ernance standpoint and are therefore not the focus of this Article, though it should be
noted that even in these cases, the controlling shareholder retains the convenient abil-
ity to effect such a separation if a sudden or unexpected need for a large amount of
external equity financing were to arise. See id. at 41. Rather, the point here is to note
that the expansion of pyramids is promoted more by the internal capital markets of
pyramids, rather than conspiracies to expropriate.
42. See id. at 2; see also Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 1, at 500.
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counted. 43 Finally, there are examples of pyramids-such as
those in Sweden-that do effect a significant ownership and vot-
ing rights gap, but expropriation generally does not occur.4 4
In light of these observations, it becomes apparent that the
view of pyramidal ownership structures as mere instruments of
control and expropriation cannot be entirely correct. In a re-
cent study along these lines, Heitor Almeida and Daniel
Wolfenzon developed a robust model of pyramids that helps ex-
plain why pyramids exist even when the separation of ownership
and voting rights is minor and other tools exist to effect this sep-
aration.45 They found that the most accurate predictor of the
prevalence of pyramids in a given country is the extent of the
difference between the terms at which the controlling share-
holder of a business group can access internal and external fi-
nance, which is generally related to the level of investor protec-
tion.46 That is, when investor protection is low and business
groups with large internal resources enjoy a financing advantage
43. See A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership, supra note 40, at 2-3. As previously men-
tioned, one explanation for this apparent irony could be the fact that the discount
incurred on nonvoting shares in countries with low investor protection-where the abil-
ity to exercise voting rights becomes all the more important to minority shareholders
with few alternative rights-discourages their use as financing tools. But the existence
of such a discount would still not validate the traditional view that controlling share-
holders who use pyramids are necessarily consumed with finding ways to separate own-
ership and voting rights, it should be noted that pyramid structures are common even
in those countries where the discount on non-voting shares is, on average, quite small.
See id. at 3. For example, Tatiana Nenova found small discounts on dual-class shares in
Canada and Sweden, two countries where pyramids abound. See Nenova, supra note 18,
at 32; see also Agnblad et al., supra note 20, at 228-58; Morck et al., supra note 17, at 332.
44. See Agnblad et al., supra note 20, at 251-52. Swedish pyramids reportedly allow
the controlling shareholder (often the Wallenberg family) to exercise an average of ten
percent more votes in the pyramid than its cash-flow rights would normally allow-yet
expropriation is generally unheard of. See id. at 229, 235-38. Swedish economists ex-
plain this anomaly by pointing to factors such as the extraordinary importance that
Swedish business families place on their reputation as social do-gooders, but an equally
plausible explanation stems from the extremely unusual characteristics of the Swedish
financial market. That is, capital markets are deep and well-developed even though the
level of investor protection is rather low. See id. at 251-53. Thus, controlling sharehold-
ers in Sweden have much less incentive to expropriate minority shareholders, since
there already exists in Sweden a critical mass of investors who will trustingly part with
their capital at reasonable terms. See id. at 229-30.
45. See A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership, supra note 40, at 1-2.
46. See id. at 3-4. Almeida and Wolfenzon also note that to a lesser extent, firms
within industries that require high levels of investment or display low levels of profitabil-
ity are more likely to be set up in pyramid. However, they note that the terms at which
external finance can be financed is the most crucial element in the analysis, and this
Article focuses on that point. See id. at 3-5.
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over competitors relying on external markets, firms inside the
pyramid are more likely to grow.4 7 Furthermore, when investor
protection is low, controlling shareholders have the incentive to
utilize pyramid structures rather than horizontal ownership
structures (even those employing dual-class votes or cross-share-
holdings), because the former generally results in a higher pay-
off advantage than the latter, since the entire cache of retained
earnings can be accessed with fewer cash-flow rights.48 This ad-
vantage is generally larger in countries where ownership and vot-
ing rights can be more easily separated (again, due to low inves-
tor protection), and pyramids are thus likely to be more preva-
lent in such countries. Yet, even in circumstances where the gap
between ownership and voting rights is minor, pyramids can still
allow controlling shareholders to access the entire stock of inter-
nal capital with only partial cash-flow rights, and they can thus
play a valuable role as an internal financing vehicle.4"
Almeida and Wolfenzon's model builds in some ways upon
Williamson's theory that business groups tend to form when re-
sources can be amassed and allocated more efficiently through
internal markets rather than external capital markets.5 ° Yet, its
main contribution to the literature is its ability to predict that
when the terms of accessing external finance descend to the cor-
responding level for the internal financial markets of business
groups (whether through stronger investor protections or other-
wise), the size of existing pyramids will shrink. Consequently,
fewer new firms will be formed inside pyramids because such
firms would gradually lose their financing advantage over com-
peting firms financed through the external market.51 In this
way, the model aids in understanding how differences in the
terms of finance accessed by group-affiliated and non-group-affil-
47. See id. at 4.
48. See id. at 3-4. Low investor protection (and thus easier access to capital internal
to the pyramid) incentivizes using pyramid structures because it allows firms to access
more funds at higher proportions than they would if they had to access capital on
outside markets. See id. at 3.
49. See id. at 3-5. In this case, however, the pyramid would likely be smaller than it
would have been if the gap between ownership and voting rights were larger, because
then the family would have been able to exercise control over more firms.
50. See The Modern Coporation: Ongins, Evolution, Attributes, supra note 28, at 1558.
51. See id. passim; see also Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, Should Business
Groups be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets, 79 J. FIN.
ECON. 99, 116-18 (2006).
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iated firms contributes to the expansion of pyramids and the in-
creased ownership and voting rights gap that results. The model
can also help explain why tunneling is often used as an avenue
of finance,5 2 and why LLS found that pyramid structures are sig-
nificantly more likely to occur in countries with low investor pro-
tection, where external capital would be more difficult to ac-
cess.
53
With this insight into the financing roles that pyramids play,
it is evident that more attention should be given to the financing
advantage reaped by controlling families through their control
of financial institutions, which enables firms within pyramids
with financial affiliates to access capital at more favorable terms
than other firms. The ill effects of such cronyism have been em-
pirically observed in economies such as Russia,54 Mexico,55 Thai-
land,56 Hong Kong, 57 and Korea.58 In Europe, it is reported that
in twenty-eight percent of publicly-held companies the ultimate
controlling shareholder also owns a commercial bank (while the
corresponding figure for East Asia is sixty percent)." These
figures would be even higher, of course, if NBFIs were included
52. See Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Ko-
rean Business Groups, 52J. FIN. 2695, 2696 (2002); Bertrand, et al., supra note 38, at 121-
22; Bianchi et al., supra note 17, at 170; Claessens et al., supra note 37.
53. See Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 1, at 500 (stating that "fully
26 percent of firms [in the authors' sample] that have ultimate owners are controlled
through pyramids. That fraction is 18 percent in countries with good shareholder pro-
tection, and 31 percent in countries with poor protection.").
54. See, e.g., Luc Laeven, Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia, 29
J. COMP. ECON. 207 (2001).
55. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Related Lending, 118 Q.J. ECON. 231 (2003); Noel
Maurer & Stephen Haber, Related Lending and Economic Performance: Evidence from Mexico
(Dec. 8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=641824 (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2006)).
56. See, e.g., Chutatong Charumilind et al., Connecting Lending: Thailand Before the
Financial Crisis (Ctr. Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 19, 2003); Piman Limpaphayom &
Sirapat Polwitoon, Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence from Thailand Before
the Asian Financial Crisis, 31 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 1577 (2004).
57. See, e.g., Steven Yan-Leung Cheung, et al., Tunneling, Propping and Expropriation:
Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=573283 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
58. See, e.g., Ming Ming Chiu & Sung WookJoh, Loans to Distressed Firms: Cronyism,
Related Lending and Bank Governance 2, 6 (Ctr. Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 2, 2004),
http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/news/paper/Sungwook%20Joh.pdf (last visited Oct. 29,
2006).
59. See La Porta et al., supra note 55, at 233.
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in the count.60
These types of relationships can have a myriad of negative
corporate governance implications. When a firm within the pyr-
amid is publicly owned, the minority shareholders of that partic-
ular firm would not be well-served if a portion of the firm's re-
tained earnings were directly used to increase the internal capi-
tal markets of the pyramid as a whole to the detriment of that
firm, and would instead expect it to be either paid back to them
in dividends or reinvested back into the firm. However, as this
Article has pointed out, the sad reality is that in countries with
low investor protection, minority shareholder capital is often ex-
propriated to affiliate firms, thus contributing to the internal
capital markets as a whole and further expansion of the pyra-
mid.61
Generally, the main weapon against this type of expropria-
tion is increased minority investor protections, consisting of, in-
ter alia, streamlined requirements for bringing derivative suits
and initiating proxy contests. However, greater investor protec-
tion mechanisms on their own fail to address one particularly
lucrative source of improper financing benefits-that of other
people's money placed in affiliated NBFIs, or even commercial
banks in rarer instances. Frequently privately held, NBFIs gener-
ally consist of insurance companies, investment trusts, merchant
banks, and securities companies. The often huge amounts of
capital captured by these institutions are certainly not "retained
earnings" to the extent that such earnings do not arise from
their share of investment income. Rather, they are asset hold-
ings on behalf of, inter alia, insurance policyholders in the case
of insurance companies (or minority shareholders in the case of
listed insurance companies), investors in the case of investment
trusts and merchant banks, and depositors in the case of com-
mercial banks. While the managers of these institutions cer-
tainly have the authority to invest these assets, they also have the
fiduciary duty to invest them in ways they believe would bring the
most value to the beneficiaries. 62 Because the investment activi-
60. See Mara Faccio et al., Debt and Expropriation 43 (July 1, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=239724 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006)).
61. See A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership, supra note 40, at 3.
62. See generally Gerard Hertig, Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of En-
forcement: A Comparison, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
328 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004)
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ties of such pyramid-affiliated financial institutions are often in-
fluenced by the controlling family, the assets of such institutions
often wind up being invested in affiliates which do not pose
sound investment opportunities, and in some cases survive
chiefly because of their crony relationship with the institution.63
The most obvious way in which families reap private benefits
through their control of financial institutions is by directing the
financial institutions to extend finance at below-market terms to
non-financial firms within the group, and this can be done in a
virtually infinite number of ways. 6 4 This subsidization effect en-
courages the creation of new firms inside the pyramid, where
they can reap the benefits of their association with finance affili-
ates, leading to an enlargement of the pyramid and the number
of firms under the control of the family. It also enables firms
within the pyramid to compete on unfair terms with firms that
do not receive such financing help, and thus discourages the
beneficial effects of competition.65
B. Taking Action: The Example of the European Union's
Directive 2002/87/EC
How can the private benefits gained through intra-group
transactions with financial affiliates be reduced? Various juris-
dictions have chosen to deal with the problem in various ways
and can serve as models to follow. The U.S. regulatory system is
not a particularly helpful model because its extraordinarily deep
securities markets and historically unique mix of federalism and
populism have given Congress and the states the ability to place
unusually severe restrictions on the investments of financial insti-
tutions.6 6 Rather, the EU is a more apt model because the preva-
63. For a particular example of this phenomenon, see the discussion of Daewoo,
infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text, and the studies cited above about cronyism
in Korea, Russia, Japan, supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text, for the proposition
that controlling families use internal capital markets to direct capital toward unsound
investments.
64. For specific examples of how such subsidization occurs in Korea, see infra
notes 136-40 and accompanying text. For a journalistic report of the crony relation-
ships between financial institutions and their affiliates in various East Asian business
groups, see MICHAEL BACKMAN, ASIAN ECLIPSE: EXPOSING THE DARK SIDE OF BUSINESS IN
ASIA 59-80 (rev. ed. 2001)
65. See Almeida & Wolfenzon, supra note 51, at 130-31.
66. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). For a summary of legislative and judi-
cial responses in the United States to the 2001-2002 scandals involving Enron,
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lence of family-controlled business groups in the region more
accurately represents the corporate environment of the develop-
ing world. In December 2002, the European Parliament
adopted Directive 2002/87/EC (the "Supplementary Supervi-
sion Directive" or the "Directive"), which called for supplemen-
tary supervision of financial conglomerates.6 7 The Directive ap-
plies many of the recommendations of the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision,68 and has since been implemented by the
EU Member States and entered into force on January 1, 2005.69
The relevant provisions are worth a brief discussion here.
The main objective of the Directive is to provide stronger
regulation of entities within "financial conglomerates," which
are defined as, inter alia, business groups headed by regulated
entities (i.e., domestic financial institutions) whose activities in
the insurance sector as well as the banking and investment ser-
vices sectors are "significant."7 Such activities are deemed "sig-
nificant" if the assets of these sectors exceed ten percent of the
group's assets based on average ratios of balance sheets and sol-
vency requirements, or if the smallest financial sector has a bal-
ance sheet total of at least C6 billion.7' These are not hard and
fast requirements, however, and the relevant authorities are
given the flexibility to bypass them if needed.7 2
Worldcom, Tyco, and others, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 336-42 (2004).
67. See Council Directive No. 2002/87, O.J. L 35/1 (2003) [hereinafter Supple-
mentary Supervision Directive].
68. See Michael Gruson, Consolidated and Supplementary Supervision of Financial
Groups in the European Union (Teil II), DER KONZERN, Apr. 15, 2004, at 253-54; see generally
Michael Gruson, Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The EU Directive on
Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, 36 INr'L LAw. 1229 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Supervision of Financial Holding Companies].
69. See Supplementary Supervision Directive, arts. 32, 33, OJ. L 35/1, at 22-23
(2003).
70. See id., art. 2(4), 2(14)(d), 2(14)(e), O.J. L 35/1, at 3-4 (2003); see also id., art.
2(14) (b), O.J. L 35/1, at 4 (2003). A streamlined description of the Directive will be
provided here, and only the provisions relevant to intra-group transactions will be men-
tioned.
71. See id., art. 3(2), O.J. L 35/1, at 5 (2003). Business groups that are not headed
by regulated entities must meet the requirements of Article 3(1) to be deemed a finan-
cial conglomerate. That is, the ratio of the balance sheet total of the regulated and
non-regulated financial sector entities in the group to the balance sheet total of the
group as a whole must exceed forty percent. See id., art. 3(1), 3(3), O.J. L 35/1, at 5
(2003).
72. See id., art. 5(4), O.J. L 35/1, at 7 (2003). The first sub-paragraph gives the
relevant authorities the flexibility to regulate entities within conglomerates that do not
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Once it is determined that a regulated entity is part of a
financial conglomerate, the intra-group transactions made by
that regulated entity are subject to supervision by competent au-
thorities,73 and such supervision includes ensuring the fairness
of the transactions. 4 "Intra-group transactions" are liberally de-
fined as "all transactions by which regulated entities within ...
financial conglomerate Is] rely either directly or indirectly upon
other undertakings within the same group or upon any natural
or legal person linked to the undertakings within that group by
'close links,' for the fulfilment of an obligation, whether or not
contractual, and whether or not for payment."75 The Directive
requires that the regulated entities file regular reports, at least
annually, of all significant intra-group transactions, and it leaves
it to the Member States' regulators to define "significant. '76 It
similarly encourages the Member States to set up their own
"quantitative limits and qualitative requirements," or to take
other measures that would achieve the objective of the Directive
in regard to intra-group transactions of regulated entities within
a financial conglomerate.77
Finally, the Directive includes strong enforcement mea-
sures. Article 17 requires Member States to give their regulators
"the power to take any supervisory measure deemed necessary in
order to avoid or to deal with the circumvention of sectoral rules
meet the requirements for being deemed a "financial conglomerate." In this case, the
authorities must then "determine whether and to what extent supplementary supervi-
sion of the regulated entities is to be carried out, as if they constitute a financial con-
glomerate." See id.
73. See id., art. 5(1), 0.J. L 35/1, at 6 (2003).
74. In his article on the European Union ("EU") Directive, Michael Gruson cites
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision to explain the intention behind the su-
pervision and regulation of intra-group transactions among financial conglomerates:
"Intra-group transactions may cause supervisory concerns when they: (i) result in capi-
tal or income being inappropriately transferred from the regulated entity; (ii) are on
terms or under circumstances which parties operating at arm's-length would not allow
and may be disadvantageous to a regulated entity; (iii) can adversely affect the solvency,
the liquidity, and the profitability of individual entities within a group; or (iv) are used
as a means of supervisory arbitrage, thereby evading capital or other regulatory require-
ments altogether." Supervision of Financial Holding Companies, supra note 68, at 1249.
75. See Supplementary Supervision Directive, art. 2(18), O.J. L 35/1, at 5 (2003).
Article 2(13) defines "close links" as either direct or indirect ownership of at least
twenty percent of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking or a relationship analo-
gous to a parent-subsidiary relationship. See id., art. 2(13), O.J. L 35/1, at 4 (2003).
76. See id., Annex II, 0J. L 35/1, at 27 (2003).
77. See id., art. 8(3), 0.J. L 35/1, at 8 (2003).
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by regulated entities in a financial conglomerate," and Article 16
calls upon regulators to take "necessary measures . . . to rectify
the situation as soon as possible" when inter-group transactions
threaten the regulated entities' financial position.7"
All in all, the structure of supervision called for in the Direc-
tive is reminiscent of Germany's style of cross-sectoral financial
supervision by a central authority. In 2002, Germany established
its Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, the duties of which
include enforcing the supervisory requirements of Germany's
Banking Act and Insurance Business Act.79 The Directive can
also be compared somewhat to Sections 23A and 23B of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act in the United States, which require a fairness
review of transactions between federally insured deposit banks
and their affiliates."0 The EU Directive's scope of supervision,
however, covers much more than transactions involving govern-
ment-insured banks.81
In that light, it is instructive to note the methods employed
by the European Parliament. The Parliament apparently did not
put much trust in the extant fiduciary duties of independent di-
rectors or asset managers of financial institutions to judge the
fairness of transactions. Cynics (or perhaps realists) might say
that this should not come as much of a surprise, given that the
independence of such actors would be questionable in Europe's
ubiquitous family-controlled business groups. But the Parlia-
ment also seemed to think that the courts could not properly do
the job alone. Instead, the Parliament seems to have felt that it
was necessary to call upon non-judicial "competent authorities"
to ensure a vigorously critical evaluation of the fairness of intra-
group transactions involving financial institutions. In this way,
78. See id., art 17(1), 0.J. L 35/1, at 12 (2003); id., art. 16, 0J. L 35/1, at 12
(2003).
79. See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervi-
sion in Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 51-52 (2003).
80. See Robert E. Mannion & Lisa R. Chavarria, Transactions Between Banks and Affil-
iated Entities, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS: UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
1121 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 2003); see also Federal Reserve Act, 12
U.S.C. § 371c(c) (1) (2000).
81. See Supplementary Supervision Directive, art. 5(2), O.J. L 35/1, 6 (2003)
("[E]very regulated entity which is at the head of a financial conglomerate; every regu-
lated entity, the parent undertaking of which is a mixed financial holding company
which has its head office in the Community; [and] every regulated entity linked with
another financial sector entity by a relationship within the meaning of Article 12(1) of
Directive 83/349/EEC" is subject to supplementary supervision).
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the Directive speaks volumes about what the EU has learned
about corporate governance through its own experience.82
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
As discussed above, the example of the regulatory structure
in the EU, where large family-owned pyramid structures domi-
nate the corporate environment, is quite fitting for comparison
with other areas of the world where pyramids are widespread.8
Partly for this reason, this Article borrows some of the concepts
of the EU Directive to propose a general regulatory structure
specifically designed to reduce the private financing benefits
reaped by members of business groups through financial affili-
ates. Such a law should begin by requiring controlling share-
holders of business groups with significant finance-related activi-
ties (including activities in the insurance sector) to provide dis-
closure of all significant transactions by privately and publicly-
held financial affiliates and their offshore subsidiaries. These
transactions should be subject to a potential fairness scrutiny by
regulators within an independent specialized bureau, which
would compare the terms of related transactions to similar arms-
length transactions and judge their fairness on that basis.84 Both
82. The EU experience leading to the passage of the Directive is also ripe for com-
parison with other areas of the world where pyramids are widespread. After all, the
judiciaries of most EU Member States are likely to be equally well equipped, and per-
haps better equipped, to fairly judge such matters compared to other such countries.
Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman point out that many developing countries do not
have a judiciary with enough independence or sophistication in corporate matters to
consistently judge the fairness of complicated transactions. See Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1911, 1925-26
(1996). Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the independent directors of other
countries where pyramids are prevalent would be any more "independent" than those
in EU Member States.
83. See generally CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 13; THE CON-
TROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE, supra note 17. In contrast, the strength of the U.S. regula-
tory structure is dependent in part on the roles played by reputational intermediaries
such as accounting firms and lawyers, which helps explain legislation such as the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley").
While the motives behind the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley are certainly understandable
in the U.S. context, one would hardly expect it to be passed in countries where the role
of reputational intermediaries is much less pronounced due to the weak roles played by
the equity markets. Rather, the EU Directive would be a much more relevant and effec-
tive role model.
84. The ideal monitoring body proposed here is an "independent specialized bu-
reau," rather than the courts, because in many countries the general courts are not
sophisticated or developed enough to evaluate the fairness of complicated corporate
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"significant finance-related activities" and "significant transac-
tions" should be defined at a low threshold to minimize any
loopholes. The latter's definition should include debt guaran-
tees or any other transactions by which collateral is pledged on
behalf of an affiliate. Furthermore, "controlling shareholder"
should be defined loosely to include in its ambit any and all
firms under that shareholder's direct or indirect control, includ-
ing offshore subsidiaries. "Affiliate" should also be defined
loosely to include those firms whose directors or officers are re-
lated to the controlling shareholder.
If the regulators discover an unfair transaction on the afore-
mentioned criteria, they should be authorized to take "necessary
measures" such as restitution of the transaction or payment of
the estimated subsidy, along with adequate penalties. Such ac-
tions would ideally be done by consent decree, and would be
reviewable by the courts (ideally on a deferential standard, since
courts are generally not experts on the fairness of transac-
tions),85 Of course, proper enforcement of the disclosure re-
quirement would be a key element to the success of the law. To
this end, the law should include a provision allowing regulators
to trace the bank accounts of regulated entities, and it should
also incorporate a strict liability standard for non-disclosure simi-
lar to the strict liability standard of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") for material misstatements in pro-
spectuses. s6 That is, if any significant transaction involving a fi-
nancial affiliate is not disclosed, such a transaction would be
deemed presumptively illegal if caught, regardless of whether
these transactions are done on ostensibly fair terms or not. 7
This strict liability standard would stimulate disclosure and help
transactions. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform:
Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1106
(2004). The monitoring body should be staffed by independent experts in corporate
transactions and financial institutions, quasi-judicial in nature because it would rule on
the legality of transactions, would be outside the general judicial system, and ideally
free of domination by any particular political party or business group. A good example
of a body which operates in this manner is the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
85. Judicial review should be cursory and deferential in light of the bureau's exper-
tise in financial transactions and the large number of decisions rendered, similar to
how federal courts in the United States exercise review over the huge number of deci-
sions by administrative law judges. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000).
87. Again, it would be important to define "significant transaction" at a low thresh-
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compensate for the difficulty in discovering undisclosed transac-
tions.
Admittedly, such a law might appear draconian, at least at
first glance, and it might also be criticized as over-regulation.
Even firms that are subject to U.S. disclosure standards are not
subject to having their financial transactions regularly reviewed
for fairness by a specialized government bureau as this proposal
requires. Rather, the SEC merely requires disclosure of certain
significant transactions, 8 the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") only engages in a tiny number of ad hoc investiga-
tions, 9 and U.S. courts are bound by state business judgment
rules when derivative suits are brought.9 ° Yet, it should be noted
that a discernible movement already exists among certain firms
in countries to voluntarily list on exchanges with greatly in-
creased standards of disclosure, and this movement tends to ne-
gate the inference that the burdens of increased disclosure nec-
essarily outweigh the potential benefits.9
With that said, there is no denying that such a regulation
would be a significant addition to the disclosure "burden" placed
upon listed firms, since it would require disclosing details of any
significant transaction involving financial affiliates. The bulk of
the added burden would be put on unlisted affiliated financial
institutions, since these affiliates would have previously been sub-
ject to little if any disclosure save for minimal regulations such as
those concerning capital adequacy requirements. As the experi-
ence of the EU Banking Directive attests, however, such a bur-
den is hardly impossible to meet, and requiring that the transac-
tions between financial institutions and affiliates be subjected to
a potential "fairness" review by government regulators is hardly
radical.
Another potential criticism of the proposed regulation is
old so that difficulty in determining whether a transaction is "significant" would not
amount to a loophole.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2000).
89. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforce-
ment, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580 (1983).
90. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101-07 (1991).
91. John Coffee refers to this phenomenon as "bonding," and points out that non-
U.S. firms often list on U.S. exchanges because the added disclosure requirements and
prestige involved in doing so often result in an increase in the firm's share value. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REv. 641, 673-75 (1999).
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that it would severely restrict pyramidal business groups' access
to finance. Such an argument essentially admits, however, that
controlling shareholders in such groups enjoy preferential terms
of finance from their financial affiliates. To be clear, the pro-
posed law does not cut off the flow of finance from these finan-
cial affiliates, it just ensures that transactions are done on fair
terms. Controlling shareholders would also remain free, of
course, to tap into the capital of the financial institutions of
other domestic or foreign business groups, capital markets
abroad, or domestic capital markets as increased disclosure qual-
ity gradually reduces the perceived risk and increases the
amount that the public is willing to pay for shares.9 2 All of these
trends would be in a positive direction.93
Finally, some would argue that it is naive to think that a
group of regulators with finite resources would be able to catch
all the undisclosed transactions, or, that the strict liability stan-
dard is too strict. These criticisms are inter-related. Of course, it
is not expected that regulators will be able to monitor every dis-
closed transaction, much less catch the ones that are improperly
undisclosed-just as the SEC in the United States is not ex-
pected to thoroughly investigate every filing it receives.94
Rather, the goal is simply to reduce the amount of cross-subsidi-
92. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 231-36, 238-40; La Porta et al., supra note 4, at
1148 (stating that large publicly traded firms get external debt finance in almost all
countries, such as from the government and its banks, regardless of legal rules). Even if
the controlling families of two separate pyramids worked out a deal whereby they would
offer each other cheap terms of finance, such a relationship would still have less dan-
gerous corporate governance implications than if such transactions were made between
affiliates, and these arms-length transactions would be much less likely to contribute to
a sustained expansion of the pyramid.
93. An increased use of the capital markets would be a desirable trend from a
monitoring standpoint as shareholder rights are improved, especially if the financial
institutions are taken public and their transactions are checked by outside monitors.
Assuming that the controlling shareholders would still retain control over all the pyra-
mids' firms, such a trend might increase the ownership and voting rights gap in the
short run. But a reduction of the amount of non-arms-length transactions involving
financial affiliates would lead to a corresponding abatement in the pyramid's ability to
enjoy advantageous terms of financing solely resulting from the affiliation of a financial
institution. Thus, the size of the pyramid-and the amount of minority shareholders
that could be expropriated-would gradually diminish in the long run. See, e.g., CHAiG,
supra note 24, at 238 (stating that "chaebols are creatures of market imperfections and
government intervention .. .as these forces diminish, chaebols will decline in the long
run.").
94. SeeJames D. Cot et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DuKE
L.J. 737, 751-52 (2003).
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zation occurring through financial affiliates to the lowest level
possible. To this end, the strict liability rule would have a strong
deterrent effect because controlling shareholders would know
that, if caught, they would be punished for enacting any undis-
closed intra-group transaction involving financial affiliates, and
not just those transactions that are caught and then found to be
"unfair." In a sense, the system could be analogized to enforcing
speed limits on the highway, which is also done on a strict liabil-
ity standard (i.e. the inquiry is simply whether the driver violated
the speed limit, and not one of "recklessness"). While it is not
expected that all speeding violations will be caught, the fact that
some are caught has an overall deterrent effect and encourages
would-be violators to abide by the rules.
Needless to say, the scope of the proposed regulatory struc-
ture goes well beyond mere improvements in investor protec-
tion, but should be employed alongside such measures and
would address minority shareholder expropriation in a more in-
direct way. Yet, while these protections enhance the ability of
shareholders to address expropriation after it happens,"5 the
proposed regulation would instead focus upon discouraging the
expansion of pyramids that leads to the incentive for expropria-
tion in the first place. The proposed structure would put a stop
to the continual cycle by which pyramids' advantageous terms of
capital stemming improperly from financial affiliates encourage
the addition of firms and growth of existing firms in the pyra-
mid, which are in turn taken public but kept under the control
of the family, leading to more expropriation.
IV. PUTTING IT ALL IN CONTEXT:
THE EXAMPLE OF KOREA
A. Preliminary Observations of the Chaebol
At this point, it is instructive to provide a concrete illustra-
tion of how such a law could be used to address business group
control over financial institutions, and why such a law might be
particularly effective in the context of pyramidal business struc-
tures with financial affiliates. As its example, this Article focuses
95. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 92, at 673-75; Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural
Distance, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 195, 210-
14 (2004). See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,
58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000).
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on Korea, whose economy is now undergoing the somewhat awk-
ward transition from a developing to a developed country, and
thus stands at a unique juncture for examination through the
lens of corporate governance. Korea, whose corporate land-
scape is dominated by numerous pyramidal business groups con-
trolled by families with the aid of financial affiliates, called
chaebol, provides a perfect backdrop to apply the theory above
because it has enacted numerous corporate legal reforms de-
signed to guard against expropriation in these chaebol.96
Throughout the 1990s and particularly in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis, Korea has witnessed improved corporate govern-
ance in the form of increased shareholder protection and a
strengthened role for independent directors, as well as attempts
by the government to reduce the financing advantage that the
chaebol receive through their affiliation with NBFIs.9 7 As this Ar-
ticle argues, however, these measures have fallen short.
At first glance, the Korean business environment may hardly
seem to be in dire need of corporate reform, especially in light
of headlines proclaiming, for instance, Samsung Electronics'
US$10 billion in net income in 2004, greater than that of either
Microsoft or Intel.9" Yet, it goes without saying that the impres-
sive performance of a few business groups in Korea simply can-
not be equated with good corporate governance. In the specific
context of Korea, it should be remembered that not so long ago,
Korea's corporate governance framework was decried by domes-
tic and international observers alike as contributing to a finan-
cial crisis that ultimately resulted in an International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") bailout.99 Although Korea has progressed since
96. See Licht, supra note 95, at 209-15.
97. In using the experience of Korea as an example for others, it should be
pointed out that the structure of Korea's financial market exhibits an important differ-
ence compared to that of many other countries where pyramids are prevalent-mainly,
Korean law prohibits business groups from owning large stakes in commercial banks,
and this prohibition does not exist in certain other countries. See, e.g., discussion infra
note 109. Even so, the experience of Korea can serve as an apt example even for this
latter group of countries, because the financing theory proposed above concerns the
financing advantage that can obtained through all types of financial institution affilia-
tions, regardless of their identity as banks or NBFIs.
98. See James Brooke & Saul Hansell, Samsung is Now What Sony Once Was, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at Cl; Evan Ramstad et al., Standing Firm: Despite Pressure, Samsung
Resists Changing Its Ways, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at Al.
99. See Ha-Joon Chang & Hong-Jae Park, An Alternative Perspective on Government
Policy towards the Chaebol in Korea: Industrial Policy, Financial Regulations and Political De-
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then in its attempts to empower minority shareholders and
strengthen the role of independent directors, the gap between
ownership and voting rights remains as wide as ever. Partly as a
result, the shares of Korea's many listed firms, a few of which are
listed on prestigious exchanges overseas, continue to suffer from
a so-called "Korea discount" of roughly twenty percent by some
estimates. 100  Furthermore, one well-known empirical study
which attempted to quantify private benefits of control in various
countries estimated such benefits to be, on average, thirty-three
percent of total market capitalization for Korean firms with dual-
class shares. 1 The author deemed this percentage to be
"alarmingly high. 10 2 Because of the disproportionate impact of
the chaebol on corporate governance in Korea and their domi-
nance in Korea's economy, no discussion of Korea's financial en-
vironment would be possible without a focused look at the struc-
ture of Korea's chaebol, and particularly, the role that their con-
trol over NBFIs played in their growth. Because general
histories of the chaebol have been presented extensively else-
where, the latter inquiry will be the focus here. 113 It should first
be pointed out, however, that by all measures, the chaebol have
played a vital role in helping the Korean economy grow at an
extraordinary rate-from a per capita income of US$80 in 1960
to US$10,543 in 1996. t°4 In particular, their organizational
mocracy, in COMPETITION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KOREA: REFORMING AND RE-
STRUCTURING THE CHAEBOL 24, 43-44 (Sung-Hee Jwa & In Kwon Lee eds., 2004).
100. See, e.g., Anna Fifield, Korea Exchange Seeks Foreign Capital, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2005, at 32.
101. Tatiana Nenova estimated the average private benefits of control observed in
eighteen countries in 1997 by taking the total value of the votes in a control block and
calculating the differences in value between voting and non-voting shares. Using this
methodology, Nenova asserted that Korea had "alarmingly high values of control," at
roughly one third of company market capitalization. See Nenova, supra note 18, at 38,
53. Using a different technique, Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales estimated the aver-
age value of control in thirty-nine countries between 1990 and 2000 by studying the
price at which controlling blocks were sold in publicly traded companies. They esti-
mated that the average private benefits of control in Korea at around fourteen percent
of company market capitalization. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 12, at 568.
102. See Nenova, supra note 18, at 38.
103. See, e.g., ALICE H. A.MSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUS-
TRIALIZATION (1989); EUN MEE KiM, BIG BUSINESS, STRONG STATE: COLLUSION AND CON-
FLICT IN SOUTH KOREAN DEVELOPMENT, 1960-1990 (1997); Kon Sik Kim, Chaebol and
Corporate Governance in Korea (Sept. 1, 1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Washington) (on file with the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library, Univer-
sity of Washington).
104. I1 Chong Nam et al., Corporate Governance in Korea, Presented Before the
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structure facilitated efficient allocation of the limited capital and
managerial talent that was available until the final decade of the
twentieth century, and they provided an expedient mechanism
by which the government could direct growth in strategic sectors
in the economy. 105 Although various studies have debated the
question of whether the chaebol invest resources as productively
as non-chaebol, most observers agree that the efficiency benefits
that do exist within chaebol structures have eroded since the
1970s.10 6 Still, the chaebol currently remain crucial drivers of Ko-
rea's economy, and the top thirty chaebol currently account for
roughly forty-five percent of total corporate assets, forty percent
of total sales, and twenty percent of total employment in Ko-
rea.'0 7  Each of them controls numerous listed and unlisted
firms.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") Conference on
Corporate Governance in Asia 1 (Mar. 3-5, 1999), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/
38/1931564.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
105. See, e.g., CHANG, supra note 24, at 91-94; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in
Firms, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 62, at
210, 226.
106. Even today, there is widespread disagreement on whether the chaebol have
invested resources more efficiently than non-chaebol. Many empirical analysts argue
that the tendency of the chaebol to over-invest and diversify across many industries low-
ers their profitability and productivity. See, e.g., Sung WookJoh & Euysung Kim, Corpo-
rate Governance and Performance in the 1990s, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RE-
STRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL 102, 113, 115-16 (Stephan Haggard et
al. eds., 2003); Jeong-Pyo Choi & Thomas G. Cowing, Firm Behavior and Group Affiliation:
The Strategic Role of Corporate Grouping for Korean Firms, 10 J. ASIAN ECON. 195, 206-07
(1999); Stephen P. Ferris et al., The Costs (and Benefits?) of Diversified Business Groups: The
Case of Korean Chaebols, 27J. BANKING & FIN. 251, 253 (2003); Sung WookJoh, Corporate
Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea Before the Economic Crisis, 68 J. FIN.
ECON. 287, 290 (2003). Others stress that in comparison to non-chaebol, the chaebol have
benefited from various advantages such as economies of scale and higher labor produc-
tivity. See, e.g., AMSDEN, supra note 103, at 151-53; Sea Jin Chang & Unghwan Choi,
Strategy, Structure and Performance of Korean Business Groups: A Transactions Cost Approach,
37J. INDUS. ECON. 141, 142 (1988); SeaJin Chang &Jaebum Hong, Economic Peformance
of Group-affiliated Companies in Korea: Intragroup Resource Sharing and Internal Business
Transactions, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 429, 445 (2000). Whatever the case, any efficiency ben-
efits arising from conglomerate structures-even assuming they exist-must be
weighed against the corporate governance implications of how these conglomerates are
managed and owned. In that light, it is instructive to note that most observers, includ-
ing the ones listed above, suggest (or at least do not deny) that the productivity advan-
tages of chaebol firms over the market as a whole have declined. See Inhak Hwang &
Jung-Hwan Seo, Corporate Governance and Chaebol Reform in Korea, 13 SEOULJ. ECON. 361,
379 (2000) (concluding on the basis of their empirical analysis of the financial struc-
tures of the top thirty chaebol that the efficiency benefits of chaebol organization began to
be outweighed by corporate governance drawbacks in the early 1990s).
107. See Jongryn Mo & Chung-in Moon, Business-Government Relations Under Kim
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How did chaebol become so large, and how have they main-
tained their continued growth to this day? The answer, as will be
argued here, is at least partially explained by the uncanny ability
that controlling families have displayed in maintaining preferen-
tial terms of finance and large stores of internal capital markets
through the progression of Korea's ever-changing financial envi-
ronment. It all began in the early stages of Korea's economic
development, when the chaebol enjoyed a virtual monopoly over
capital. When the Park Chung Hee government came to power
in the early 1960s and nationalized banks as a means of develop-
ment policy, it set artificially low interest rates for the banks and
directed these loans to favored business groups, which invested
the capital in certain strategic heavy industries chosen by the
government. 10 8 At the time, the government's rationale for na-
tionalizing the banks was probably to prevent the chaebol from
taking control over them and thus gaining a source of capital
independent of government influence. After the assassination
of Park in 1979, his successor Chun Doo Hwan basically kept this
policy in place when he privatized the commercial banks but
prohibited the chaebol from owning a controlling stake in
them.10 9 Even so, the chaebol continued to receive cheap loans
from the banks due in part to the perception that the former
were a low credit risk-a perception caused in no small part by
the widespread belief that the government would come to the
rescue if these behemoths were ever in distress-and because
the government still exercised influence over the banks' lending
decisions. °
Dae-jung, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING
THE CHAEBOL, supra note 106, at 127, 135; Hwang & Seo, supra note 106, at 363.
108. See Yoon-Je Cho & David C. Cole, The Role of the Financial Sector in Korea's Struc-
tural Adjustment, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY. THE
KOREAN EXPERIENCE 115, 122, 126-27 (Vittorio Corbo & Sang-Mok Suh eds., 1992);
Wonhyuk Lim, The Emergence of the Chaebol and the Origins of the Chaebol Problem, in Eco-
NOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL,
supra note 106, at 35, 44.
109. In 1982, the government placed an eight percent limit on the amount of
ownership one could hold own in a national commercial bank, and this limit was later
tightened to four percent in 1998. See Yung Chul Park & Dong Won Kim, Korea: Devel-
opment and Structural Change of the Banking System, in THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND LIBERALIZATION 188, 195 (Hugh
T. Patrick & Yung Chul Park eds., 1994).
110. Commercial banks were discouraged from taking active monitoring roles
through equity stakes, since the government effectively told the banks to make loans to
certain entities, and the Banking Law prohibited them from owning more than ten
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Meanwhile, the chaebol stood poised to take advantage of an-
other crucial peculiarity of Korea's style of state-guided eco-
nomic development, one that enabled the chaebol to continue
enjoying advantageous terms of finance even after the policy
loans dried up. That is, the artificially low interest rates that
were enforced upon banks by the government led to a parallel
curb market with much higher interest rates, which naturally di-
verted huge amounts of capital from the regulated financial mar-
ket. In response, the government greatly liberalized its licensing
procedures for establishing NBFIs in the early 1970s, hoping to
absorb the curb market and channel these funds back into the
regulated market. The government did not place the same re-
strictions on chaebol ownership of NBFIs, however, and the
chaebol voraciously seized on this opportunity to gain reliable
sources of capital independent of government influence.'11 Be-
cause NBFIs could offer depositors much higher interest rates
than the highly regulated banks, they rapidly grew in size and
soon began to overtake commercial banks in terms of deposits.
For example, from 1975 to 1993, the percentage of Korea's total
financial savings entrusted to banks in the form of deposits de-
clined from sixty percent to twenty-four percent, while the share
of deposits in NBFIs rose from twenty-eight percent to sixty-eight
percent.' 12 The advantages reaped by the chaebol through NBFIs
further increased throughout the 1990s, when the government
granted licenses to twenty-four additional merchant banks
(which were mostly owned by the chaebol, of course) and en-
percent of the equity of non-financial firms (later raised to fifteen percent in 1998). See
Myeong-Hyeon Cho, Reform of Corporate Governance, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL, supra note 106, at 286, 294; Park &
Kim, supra note 109, at 195-96; Nam et al., supra note 104, 97.
111. See Choon Taik Chung, Financial Sector Reforms and Liberalization in The Repub-
lic of Korea: Current Status and Prospects, in FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS, ECONOMIC
GROWTH, AND STABILITY: EXPERIENCES IN SELECTED ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUN-
TRIES 261, 262-63 (Shakil Faruqi ed., 1994);Joon-Ho Hahm, The Government, the Chaebol,
and Financial Institutions Before the Economic Crisis, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL, supra note 106, 79, 83-87; Byung-
Kook Kim, The Politics of Chaebol Reform, 1980-1997, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL, supra note 106, at 62; Lawrence J.
White, Structure of Finance in Selected Asian Economies, in FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
IN ASIA 37, 60, 90-92 (Shahid N. Zahid ed., 1995); XIAoKE ZHANG, THE CHANGING POLIT-
ICS OF FINANCE IN KOREA AND THAILAND: FROM DEREGULATION TO DEBACLE 93 (2003).
112. See Won-Am Park, Financial Liberalization: The Korean Experience, in FINANCIAL
DEREGULATION AND INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA 247, 254 tbl.9.4 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne 0.
Krueger eds., 1996).
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couraged them to raise funds in foreign capital markets.' 1 3
These actions were perhaps due to its fear that foreigners would
take over Korean financial institutions after financial regulatory
barriers were lifted in the early 1990s under U.S. pressure.114
The growth of chaebol-affiliated NBFIs further increased in 1996,
when the Kim Young Sam government loosened restrictions on
chaebol ownership of insurance companies and investment
trusts, 115 and the use of investment trusts exploded during the
Asian financial crisis as a method by which to prop up affiliates.
A few statistics are instructive: in the period between 1980
and 1988, the percentage of Daewoo's assets attributed to finan-
cial services companies jumped from seven percent to thirty-nine
percent, and the corresponding percentage for Samsung
jumped from twenty-one percent to forty-five percent." 6 By the
early 1990s, NBFIs replaced commercial banks as the principal
source of loans to the corporate sector, and about half the assets
of the life insurance industry were dedicated to loans." 7 By the
time of the financial crisis, the seventy largest chaebol owned 140
NBFIs, with thirty of these NBFIs owned by the top five chaebol
alone.'1 8 The crisis itself was marked by a huge increase in
chaebol use of investment trust companies to prop up ailing affili-
ates, but many of these NBFIs were shut down or merged, and
the public had to bear much of the bad debt.' 9 More recently,
the credit card debt crisis that has afflicted Korea has made some
of the NBFIs seem more like liabilities than assets to their chaebol
affiliates. However, such cycles come and go, and many chaebol-
affiliated NBFIs-particularly insurance companies-maintain
their cash cow status regardless of the economic climate. 2 ° Sam-
113. Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea,
Taiwan and the Asian Financial Crisis, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITEC-
TURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 80, 94 (Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill eds., 2000).
114. See Byung-Kook Kim, supra note 111, at 63.
115. See Cheung H. Lee et al., Chaebol, Financial Liberalization, and Economic Crisis:
Transformation of Quasi-Internal Organization in Korea 11 (Seoul Nat'l Univ. Inst. of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 31, 2000), http://ideas.repec.org/p/snu/ioerwp/
no31.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
116. See EUN MEE KIM, supra note 103, at 189.
117. See White, supra note 111, at 91.
118. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 61; Hahm, supra note 111, at 87.
119. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Financial Reform: Progress and Challenges, in KOREA'S
ECONOMY, 2000, at 22, 23 (2000); Nam et al., supra note 104, 21, 101.
120. A fitting comparison is that of between the current status of Samsung Card
and Samsung Life. The former is a credit card provider that has lost money for the last
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sung Life, for example, currently boasts assets of over US$80 bil-
lion,"' and Kyobo Life is not far behind.122
The point is this: while the initial growth of many of Ko-
rea's chaebol can be largely attributed to policy loans extended by
the government well into the 1980s, the ability of the chaebol to
continue expanding at exponential rates resulted partly from
their ability to continue receiving cheap finance with little ac-
countability from affiliated NBFIs. While it may be true that the
perception that the chaebol were too big to fail did contribute
somewhat to the advantageous terms of external loans they re-
ceived, it was their control over lucrative NBFIs that has given
many of the chaebol firms a nearly insurmountable financing ad-
vantage over independent firms.
B. The Role of Financial Institutions in the Growth of the Chaebol
To this day, the controlling families of chaebol have utilized
their control over NBFIs to (1) maintain their ownership over
large numbers of firms through the shareholdings of the NBFIs,
and (2) provide cheap finance to affiliates through cross-subsidi-
zation. In terms of the former, the families have often used their
NBFIs as modified holding companies, taking advantage of the
large reserves of cash to buy up the equity of affiliates. Although
the use of holding companies is restricted in Korea,123 it is not
uncommon to see nearly half the equity portfolios of NBFIs in-
vested in affiliates.1 24 Various reports on the circular-sharehold-
ing structures of the chaebol, such as data published by the Fair
several years and has required cash infusions of over US$1 billion from Samsung Elec-
tronics in the past two years to stay afloat. See Ramstad, supra note 98, at Al. Samsung
Life, on the other hand, boasted assets of over 83 trillion won (US$82 billion) as of
fiscal year 2003. See Financial Services, Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd., http://
www.samsung.com/AboutSAMSUNG/SAMSUNGGroup/AffiliatedCompanies/
FinancialServices/Lifelnsurance.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
121. As of fiscal year 2003, Samsung Life had assets of over 83 trillion won (US$82
billion). See Financial Services, Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd., supra note 120.
122. See Kyobo Life Annual Report 2003, http://www.kyobo.co.kr/introduction/
ciencifianannual.do# (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
123. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320 arts. 8 to 8-3
(1980) (S. Korea) [hereinafter Fair Trade Act].
124. For example, the cross-holdings of Samsung-affiliated NBFIs play an impor-
tant role in maintaining the Lee family's control over the Samsung chaebol as a whole.
See PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, HANGUKUI CHAEPOL:
KICH'OCHARYO SUCHIP, BUNSOK MIT P'YONGGA [KOREA'S CHAEBOL: A COLLECTION OF BA-
SIC DATA, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION] 78 (2003).
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Trade Commission and the shareholder activist group People's
Solidarity for a Participatory Democracy ("PSPD"),125 shed light
on the widespread use of NBFIs in this way; as do empirical stud-
ies such as one conducted by three economists from the Korea
Development Institute and the Korea Advanced Institute of
Technology. 126 In their study of the ownership structures of the
forty-six largest chaebol between 1997 and 2002, in which they
studied data on the equity holdings of unlisted NBFIs, these
economists found that controlling shareholders purposely con-
centrated their cash flow rights in (often unlisted) firms that
served as de facto holding companies, and these firms were usu-
ally affiliated NBFIs. 127 Other empirical studies have found simi-
lar results. 28
The second way in which controlling families have utilized
their control over NBFIs has been to cross-subsidize affiliates
through below-market terms of finance. This can be done using
a variety of methods, but some of the more obvious ways have
involved directing NBFIs to provide loans to affiliates at systemat-
ically below-market interest rates, or refraining from charging
any interest at all for certain periods. For example, several
NBFIs within the Daewoo Group were caught doing this in the
late 1990s;129 and, in the midst of the financial crisis, Daehan
Life Insurance was discovered to have made loans of US$2.7 bil-
lion to its affiliates with the SK Group, an amount that was far
above the limit allowed by law at the time, and all of which had
to be later written off.130 Yet another cross-subsidization method
has involves directing NBFIs to purchase the bonds and promis-
sory notes of affiliates at below-market interest rates. Samsung
125. For the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy ("PSPD") publication,
see id. Korea's Fair Trade Commission publishes its reports on its website at http://
www.ftc.go.kr/eng.
126. See generally Woochan Kim, Youngjae Lim & Taeyoon Sung, What Determines
the Ownership Structure of Business Conglomerates?: On the Cash Flow Rights of Korea's Chaebol
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 51, 2004), http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=594741 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
127. See id. at 2-3, 30.
128. See, e.g., Daehong T. Jaang et al., Cross Shareholding and Corporate Financial Pol-
icy: The Case of Korea 16 (Sungkyunkwan Univ., Working Paper No. 2002-02, 2002),
http://biz.korea.ac.kr/%7Eaicg/paper_2nd/Cross-shareholdingandcCorporatefi-
nancial.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
129. See CHANqG, supra note 24, at 151.
130. See Hahm, supra note 111, at 88.
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and Daewoo have been particularly fond of using this method,"'
though Daewoo was perhaps the worst abuser. Not only did
Daewoo use NBFIs such as Daewoo Capital, Daewoo Securities,
and Diners Capital to this end,'32 but it also secretly used an
NBFI called Seoul Investment Trust Company to purchase bil-
lions of dollars worth of bonds and commercial paper issued by
Daewoo affiliates in 1998 and 1999. All of them had to be writ-
ten off after Daewoo's collapse.'33 A third cross-subsidization
method has been to direct an NBFI to issue debt guarantees on
behalf of affiliates with little or no consideration.' 34 In fact, the
prevalence of this practice in Korea led one respected scholar of
Korean corporate governance to remark in the mid-1990s that it
is "well-established" that the debts of chaebol firms are guaran-
teed by affiliate firms with no pecuniary consideration at all.13 5
Showing no lack of creativity, the chaebol have also employed
more indirect methods. For example, the Samsung Group
orchestrated a deal with several commercial banks, whereby
Samsung Life extended subordinated loans to these banks,
which in turn purchased the private placement bonds of other
Samsung affiliates. 3 6 Another method that has proven particu-
larly problematic for government regulators has been the heavy
use of offshore funds by the chaebol. Many of these offshore
funds are set up by chaebol-affiliated NBFIs and operated in an
opaque manner, and their subsidization of affiliates has been
particularly difficult to catch. 13 7 Also, chaebol families can use
131. For example, Sea-Jin Chang documents that between January and July 1997,
69.3 percent of all of Samsung Securities' bond acquisitions was of Samsung affiliates,
and the corresponding figure for Daewoo Securities' bond acquisitions of Daewoo affili-
ates was 51.1 percent. In this way, these securities houses functioned as secure sources
of financing for their affiliates. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 138.
132. See id. at 151.
133. See Dong Gull Lee, The Restructuring of Daewoo, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND COR-
PORATE RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL, supra note 106, at 154,
175.
134. Although Article 10-2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act ("Fair
Trade Act") currently prohibits debt guarantees among affiliates, it exempts from its
terms financial institutions, which are instead regulated by other laws that generally
allow them to extend debt guarantees to affiliates to a certain extent. See Fair Trade
Act, No. 3320 art. 10-2 (1980) (S. Korea).
135. See Kim, supra note 103, at 136-37. Article 10-2 of the Fair Trade Act has since
prohibited debt guarantees among firms in large chaebol, but financial institutions are
currently exempt from its terms.
136. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 153.
137. See Nam, supra note 104, 1 99 (noting that the chaebol "have been using their
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their control over the NBFIs to manipulate the prices of affiliate
stocks held by the latter. For example, in 1999, Hyundai Securi-
ties was found to be manipulating the stock price of several Hy-
undai affiliates, including Hynix, for the family's gain.13 Finally,
rumors that Samsung Life wanted to go public ignited a hot de-
bate on whether and how the proceeds should be allocated be-
tween policyholders and shareholders (the vast majority of
which are members of the Lee family or Samsung affiliates).
The confusion is partly due to the organization of Korean insur-
ance companies as corporations, rather than mutual companies,
and the fact that many of the insurance policies contain an ele-
ment of investment profit-sharing. 9 The Chairman of the Sam-
sung Group had originally wanted to take Samsung Life public
to help pay off the enormous debts incurred by Samsung Mo-
tors, after a controversial transaction in which he sold his shares
in Samsung Life to Samsung Motors creditors at a price later
viewed as grossly inflated.14 °
C. The Aftermath of Chaebol Growth
By and large, it is evident that these connections have al-
lowed chaebol affiliates to access credit lines far in excess of their
equity or what their financial health would normally allow. This
phenomenon, to say the least, has limited the disciplinary ability
of the market. 4 ' Yet, with the exception of the most obvious
and egregious cases, it is often difficult to gather exact data on
affiliated MBCs, especially their overseas branches, and to a lesser extent their insur-
ance companies, to finance the activities of other subsidiaries within their groups.");
Kim Ji-Hyun, Companies Caught Illegally Operating Offshore Funds, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 9,
2002; Yon-Se Kim, Financiers' Losses From Offshore Funds Surge, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 9,
2002.
138. See Finance and Economics: Murkier and Murkier, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999, at
76-77; Yon-Se Kim, Minority Shareholders Win Damage Suit Against Hyundai, KOREA TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2003. Five researchers at the Korea Development Institute have also listed
other ways in which the chaebol have used their control over NBFIs to finance affiliates,
including, "priority underwriting of securities issued by related subsidiaries, provision of
preferential financial services and information on competing firms, [and] management
of related firms' shares and their prices." Nam, supra note 104, 99.
139. See Semin Park, Going Public and Listing of Life Insurance Companies on Stock
Markets and Profit Sharing in Korea: A Legal Study, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 129, 131-35
(2000).
140. See Creditors Facing Tough Going in Selling Samsung Life Shares, KOR.A HERALD,
Apr. 23, 2001; Song-Soo Park, Taxpayers Write Off Samsung Motor's Debts, KORA.A TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2001.
141. See Joh & Kim, supra note 106, at 110.
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the extent to which NBFI capital has been siphoned off to affili-
ates, due in no small part to the lack of transparency. In con-
ducting this inquiry, one place to start is the series of four inves-
tigations of the top five chaebol conducted by Korea's Fair Trade
Commission between 1998 and 2000.42 These investigations
covered all transactions, and not just those involving NBFIs, but
by way of background it is helpful to note that the Commission
found a total of 20.3 trillion won (US$14.5 billion) of what it
classified as unfair business transactions between the firms of
these five chaebol alone, which it estimated resulted in a total of
640 billion won (US$457 million) in direct cross-subsidies.143 In
many of these cases, publicly traded firms were subsidizing pri-
vately held firms. 14 4 Furthermore, several empirical studies have
been conducted that shed light specifically on the cross-subsidi-
zation role of NBFIs such as one published in the late 1990s by
Joon-Kyung Kim. 145 This study found that throughout the 1990s,
chaebol firms with NBFI affiliates systematically borrowed at a sig-
nificantly lower rate than firms that were not affiliated with
NBFIs. 146 Although the lower terms at which chaebol could bor-
row can be partly explained by the fact that banks viewed the
chaebol as lower bankruptcy risks (due in part to the perception
that the government would come to their rescue in times of dis-
tress), Kim's study found a sudden large increase in the interest
rate gap in the late 1990s which he attributed to the chaebol's
manipulation of their control over NBFI in the distressed envi-
ronment of the Asian financial crisis. 1
4 7
Furthermore, several empirical studies have shed light spe-
cifically on the cross-subsidization role of NBFIs such as one con-
ducted in the late 1990s by Joon-Kyung Kim.' 41 They inter-
preted the data as evidence of crony relationships between
142. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 126-29.
143. See id. at 128. These figures would have been even higher had Daewoo not
gone bankrupt in 1999. See id. The exchange rate has been calculated at US$1=1400
won, which was roughly the average for the 1998-2000 period.
144. See id. at 129.
145. See Joon-Kyung Kim, Assessment of Progress in Corporate Restructuring in Korea
Since the 1997-98 Crisis, in EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 47, 56
(Stijn Claessens & Dongsoo Kang eds., 2003).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Ming Ming Chiu & Sung Wook Joh, Loans to Distressed Firms: Cronyism,
Related Lending and Bank Governance 2, 6 (Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of
Economics, Working Paper No. 44, 2004) (on file with author).
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NBFIs and their non-financial affiliates.1 49 In yet another empir-
ical study, Hyun-Han Shin and Young S. Park found that firms
within the top thirty chaebol were less subject to financing con-
straints than other firms in the mid-1990s, partly as a result of
the contribution of NBFIs to the internal capital markets of
these chaebol.'5°
As the chaebol continued to grow, the families felt comforta-
ble accessing the burgeoning equity markets as long as their con-
trol over these firms was guaranteed-easily done, of course,
through the use of pyramid structures and circular sharehold-
ings. "' In fact, despite the argument of some economists that
the chaebol have over-relied upon debt financing because of their
aversion to issuing equity and losing corporate control,1 1 2 the
problem was exactly the opposite. That is, chaebol families have
issued an increasing proportion of their firms' equities while re-
taining control by using the votes of affiliated firms, and the re-
sult has been an increasingly large gap in ownership and voting
rights, which, when combined with the increasingly large size of
the chaebol themselves, has given rise to an increasingly large
number of minority shareholders whose investments are indi-
rectly controlled by a chaebol family. Thus, the average percent-
age of chaebol equities directly held by the controlling family de-
clined throughout the 1990s, but this decline was easily compen-
sated for by a rise in the percentage of equities held by
affiliates. 5 ' The sad implications of this phenomenon have
been enormous from a corporate governance standpoint, as was
demonstrated by the ubiquitous headlines in Korea proclaiming
the expropriation of increasingly large numbers of minority
149. See id.
150. See Hyun-Han Shin & Young S. Park, Financing Constraints and Internal Capital
Markets: Evidence from Korean Chaebols, 5J. CORP. FIN. 169, 172-73 (1999).
151. Cross-shareholding is prohibited among firms of most of those chaebol regu-
lated by the Fair Trade Act. Furthermore, issuing dual class common stock is illegal,
and dual class preferred stock has not really taken off in Korea for various reasons. See,
e.g., Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on Inter-
national Competition, 21 U. PA. J. Ir'L ECON. L. 273 (2000).
152. See, e.g., Seong Min Yoo & Youngjae Lim, Big Business in Korea: New Learning
and Policy Issues 39-40 (Korean Development Insititute, Working Paper No. 9901, 1999),
http://www.kdi.re.kr/kdi/report/report-read05.jsp?1=1&pub no=971 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2006).
153. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
ECONOMIC SURVEYS: KORA 2000-2001 135 (2001).
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shareholders by chaebol families. 154
The gap between ownership and voting rights continues to
this day. In December 2004, the Korean Fair Trade Commission
("KFTC") reported that among Korea's thirty-six chaebol with as-
sets in excess of two trillion won (roughly US$2 billion), the re-
spective chairman owned an average of only 1.95 percent of the
total shares of the firms within the chaebol with his family owning
another 2.66 percent. These tiny equity stakes were hugely sup-
plemented by an average of 41.7 percent control exercised
through the circular shareholdings of affiliates. 155 Furthermore,
in 469 of the 781 firms that were associated with these thirty-six
chaebol, the controlling families did not own a single share in the
firm yet controlled the firm indirectly through the firm's affili-
ates. 15 6 Perhaps the most egregious example of voting and own-
ership separation was that of Daewoo before its bankruptcy:
Chairman Kim Woo-Joong and his family held only 0.04 percent
of Daewoo's flagship subsidiary, Daewoo Motors, yet controlled
94.5 percent of its shares through the votes of affiliated compa-
154. There are too many examples to list, but three will suffice here involving the
Samsung Group, the LG Group, and the SK Group. Beginning in 1999, Samsung
smoothed its impending father-to-son succession transfer by orchestrating an issuance
of 3.21 million convertible bonds of Samsung SDS, a publicly-traded Samsung subsidi-
ary, to Jae-Yong Lee, the son of the Samsung chairman, and other family members at
prices far below the going market rate. Thus, the shares of Samsung SDS minority
shareholders were diluted, while Jae-Yong Lee's stake in Samsung SDS was raised to
10.1 percent. At around the same time, the controlling family of LG pocketed windfall
gains at the expense of LG Chemical's minority shareholders when it arranged a sale of
its 1.18 million shares in the unlisted LG-Caltex Oil subsidiary to LG Chemical at a price
most observers considered extremely high. LG Chemical's purchase of the family's
shares in the unlisted LG Mart subsidiary elicited similar criticism. See Cheong-mo Yoo,
Court Ruling Suspends Samsung Group's Father-to-son Power Transfer Attempt, KoREA HERALD,
May 11, 2000; Cheong-mo Yoo, LG Group Owner Family Learns Lesson from Samsung Chair-
man's Stock Scandal, KoREA HERALD, May 12, 2000. Finally, the SK Group was found to
be expropriating SK Telecom shareholders by orchestrating transactions between pub-
licly-held SK Telecom and two of its affiliates, Daehan Telecom and SK Distribution,
which were virtually wholly owned by the controlling family of the SK Group. Both
Daehan Telecom and SK Distribution were found to have charged SK Telecom hugely
inflated prices for certain service contracts and equipment. The results were telling:
Between 1994 (when the SK Group purchased the predecessor of SK Telecom from the
Korean government) and 1997, Daehan's operating income rose from 64 million won
to 18.2 billion won. Conversely, SK Telecom's operating margin dropped by over half
in the same period. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 183.
155. See Min-hee Kim, Chaebol Heads Control Empires with Less than 2 Percent Stake,
KoREA HERALD, Dec. 28, 2004.
156. See id.
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V. ADDRESSING CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION WITHIN THE
CHAEBOL: THE PROPOSED LAW IN CONTEXT
A. Recent Legal Reforms Addressing the Chaebol
As one might imagine, the alarming implications of the
huge gap between ownership and voting rights within the chaebol
have not gone unnoticed by Korea's policymakers and regula-
tors, particularly in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.
158
In the wake of the crisis, a huge shakeout of the financial indus-
try took place, with many NBFIs and banks being shut down,
merged, or having their default assets bought out by the govern-
ment's Korea Asset Management Corporation.1 5 With IMF
prodding, great strides were made in reducing cross-debt guar-
antees among chaebol affiliates, 6 ' and NBFIs are now required to
have audit committees which are at least two-thirds composed of
independent directors.161 Much of the impressive well-publi-
cized progress, however, has occurred in the areas of investor
protection and decision-making governance,162 and these mea-
157. See Ha SungJang, Corporate Governance and Economic Development: The
Korean Experience, Presented at KDI-World Bank Conference on Democracy, Market
Economy, and Development, Seoul, Korea (Feb. 26, 1999), at 5-6, http://
idep.kdi.re.kr/conference/program/participants/JangHaSung/JangHaSung-e_
paperfulltext.htm.
158. See CHANc, supra note 24, at 190.
159. See id. at 192.
160. See id. at 190, 202.
161. See, e.g., Specialized Credit Financial Business Act, No. 5374 art. 50-5 (1997),
amended by Act. No. 6430 (2001) (S. Korea); Insurance Business Act, No. 3043 art. 16
(1977), amended by Act. No. 6175 (2000) (S. Korea); Act on Business of Operating Indi-
rect Investment and Assets, No. 6987 art. 12 (2003) (S. Korea).
162. For example, Korean law formerly required at least five percent ownership to
exercise basic shareholder rights such as calling a meeting, accessing account books,
and perhaps most crucially, filing derivative suits, but shareholders are now allowed to
bring shareholders' derivatives suits much more easily, as well as inspect their firm's
accounting books and select directors through a cumulative voting system. Further-
more, firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange or KOSDAQ are required to have
boards with at least one-fourth independent directors (and up to one-half for the larg-
est firms), as well as audit committees. See, e.g., Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the
Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 273, 329 (2000); Jae Yeol Kwon, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Approach to the South Korean Statutory Scheme, 12 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 299, 330-31 (2003); Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Struc-
ture: A Kaleidoscope of Corporate Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 183, 225-26 (2002). Suffice it to say that arguments have already arisen
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sures have not adequately addressed the vast ownership and vot-
ing rights gap. In particular, because a controlling family often
funnels control over its pyramid through a privately-owned firm,
it is very difficult for outside shareholders to exert any influence
on the pyramid structure as a whole. For example, control of
the Samsung group is channeled through Samsung Everland, a
privately-held firm controlled by the son of the group's chair-
man.163
Seemingly aware of the limits of investor protection mea-
sures, the government has also enacted specific measures that
address the internal financing advantages enjoyed by chaebol.
For example, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
("Fair Trade Act") has prohibited new debt guarantees among
affiliated non-financial firms in most of the top thirty chaebol
since 1998.164 However, the Fair Trade Act currently exempts
financial institutions and insurance companies from its terms be-
cause their investment and financing activities are regulated by
other specialized laws.' 6 5 These specialized laws do not limit the
ability of NBFIs to engage in such practices as strictly as the Fair
Trade Act. For example, Article 106 of the Insurance Business
Act regulates the asset management activities of insurance com-
panies, and it allows insurance companies to issue up to three
percent of their equity in loans and debt guarantees to any one
affiliate. 16
6
None of these laws govern the fairness of financial transac-
tions. For that, Korean lawmakers have focused on giving
within the legal academy that shareholders have been given too much power vis-a-vis
directors. See, e.g.,Johneth Chongseo Park & Doo-Ah Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: A
Missing Piece in the Developing Puzzle of Korean Corporate Governance Reform, 3 J. KOREAN L.
15, 45-47 (2003).
163. See, e.g., Wonhyuk Lim et al., Introduction: The Political Economy of Corporate
Restructuring, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RESTRUcTURING IN KOR.A: RE-
FORMING THE CHAEBOL, supra note 106, at 1, 4.
164. See CHANG, supra note 24, at 155-56; Kwangshik Shin, Competition Law and Pol-
icy, in ECONOMIC CRIsIs AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE
CHAEBOL, supra note 106, at 265, 273. Each year, the Fair Trade Commission designates
which chaebol will be designated as "enterprise groups" subject to the various restrictions
such as a ceiling on the total amount of cross-shareholding and cross-debt guarantees.
See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade, Act No. 3320 art. 14(1) (1980), amended by
Act No. 7315 (2004) (S. Korea).
165. See Fair Trade Act, No. 3320 art. 10-2 (1980), inserted by Act No. 4513 (1992),
amended by Act No. 5503 (1998) (S. Korea).
166. See Insurance Business Act, No. 3043 art. 106 (1977), amended by Act No. 5500
(1998) (S. Korea).
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greater roles and responsibilities to independent directors and
the board of directors as a whole. As previously mentioned,
NBFIs are now required to have audit committees at least two-
thirds staffed by independent directors, 16' and Article 191-19 of
the Securities and Exchange Act now requires board approval
for certain transactions with affiliates. 168 Finally, Article 382-3 of
the Commercial Code now specifically lays out the fiduciary du-
ties of directors. 169 Although these developments mark a posi-
tive trend, the role played by so-called independent directors in
zealously reviewing intra-group transactions should be viewed
skeptically in any country despite the laws on the books. Korea is
no exception. There is no evidence that the increased roles
given to independent directors of NBFIs has resulted in a de-
crease in intra-group subsidization.
The final main strategy used by lawmakers to address the
role of chaebol-affiliated NBFIs in contributing to the ownership
and voting rights gap deals with the chaebol families' use of NBFI
voting rights.17 In the wake of the financial crisis up until 2002,
the Fair Trade Act prohibited those chaebol that were regulated
by the Act from exercising any of the voting rights that its NBFIs
possessed in affiliates, since this method was seen as a primary
way by which chaebol families could exercise control over firms in
which they had little equity ownership. However, due to fierce
chaebol lobbying and cries that the prohibition would result in
chaebol affiliates being taken over by foreigners, the Fair Trade
Act was amended in 2002 to allow these chaebol families to em-
ploy the votes of NBFIs to exercise up to an aggregate of thirty
percent of affiliate voting rights in member firms. 171 The battle
167. See, e.g., id. art. 16; Specialized Credit Financial Business Act, No. 5374 art. 50-
5 (1997), amended by Act No. 6430 (2001) (S. Korea); Act on the Business of Operating
Indirect Investment and Assets, No. 6987 art. 12 (2003) (S. Korea).
168. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 191-19, amended by Act No. 7025
(2003), Act No. 7114 (2004).
169. See Commercial Code, No. 1000 art. 382-3 (1962), amended by Act No. 5591
(1998) (S. Korea).
170. In addition, Article 10 of the Fair Trade Act prohibits any firms within large
chaebol from devoting more than twenty-five percent of their net worth to purchase the
equity stakes of affiliates, but the chaebol have figured out ways to get past this require-
ment.
171. That is, chaebol families could continue to use the votes of non-financial firms
to control affiliated firms without limitation like before, but NBFI votes could also be
employed in controlling an affiliate firm until total ownership in that firm by all its
affiliates reached the thirty percent mark. For example, suppose Firms A, B, and C
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is not yet over, and the latest revision to the Fair Trade Act,
which was passed in December 2004, calls for this percentage
limitation to be gradually reduced to fifteen percent by April
2008.172 Alongside this rule, Article 10 of the Fair Trade Act
continues to prohibit chaebol firms from using more than twenty-
five percent of their assets in acquiring stocks in affiliates, but
financial and insurance affiliates are exempted from this rule as
well. 73 Other exceptions also apply, and chaebol who have debt-
equity ratios below one hundred percent will be exempted from
the law entirely until 2007.174
Unfortunately, while the rationale behind the restrictions
on NBFI voting rights is understandable, these restrictions are
unlikely to result in a reduction of the ownership and voting
rights gap. After all, the families can simply rearrange their
cross-shareholdings and channel their voting rights through
more non-financial firms to comply with the limit. Nor is it likely
that Korean lawmakers will have the political will to seriously
hamper the voting rights exercised by chaebol families to the ex-
tent that the latter would be forced to give up control over their
firms. The chaebol exert immense political power, after all, and
they have argued that such laws would make their firms more
prone to foreign takeover.1 75 Considering the inroads that for-
eign hedge funds have made in recent years, their fears do have
an element of truth to them, and it is highly likely that the Ko-
rean public as a whole does not want to see their flagship firms
each own twenty percent of Firm D, and all four firms are members of the same chaebol.
Also suppose that Firms A and B are non-financial firms, Firm C is an NBFI, and no
other affiliate firm has an ownership interest in Firm D. Under the 2002 amendment,
Firms A and B would still be allowed to exercise their aggregate forty percent voting
interest in Firm D, but none of Firm C's votes in Firm D could be exercised because the
thirty percent aggregate limit had already been surpassed. Similarly, if Firms A, B, and
C each owned twelve percent of Firm D, Firms A and B would be allowed to exercise
their full twenty-four percent votes, but Firm C, the NBFI, would only be allowed to
exercise half of its twelve percent interest (six percent) of its votes in Firm D because
the thirty percent aggregate limit had been met.
172. See Fair Trade Act, No. 3320 art. 9 (Addendum, Dec. 31, 2004) (S. Korea).
173. See id. art. 10(1), 10(7), amended by Act. No. 6043 (1999) (S. Korea).
174. See So-Young Kim, Rules Eased For Chaebol Investment, KoPRA HERALD, Feb. 15,
2005. Recently, the chaebol were even able to wrestle out of the National Assembly an
exception for those groups which invest in certain high-tech growth industries. See Min-
hee Kim, Investment Cap to be Eased for Growth Industries, KoR.A HERALD, MAR. 11, 2005.
175. See, e.g., Min-hee Kim, Big Business Disappointed over Fair Trade Bill, KoREA HER-
ALD, Dec. 11, 2004.
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taken over by foreigners, regardless of the personal views they
hold on chaebol governance.
B. Application of the Proposed Regulatory Structure to Korea
In this light, the regulatory structure proposed by this Arti-
cle would be especially useful in the Korean context. 176 It would
place more emphasis on the financial benefits gained from
chaebol control of NBFIs, rather than the voting benefits, and
would thus not contribute to the unpalatable risk of foreign
takeover. The "independent specialized bureau" could be set up
within the KFTC, which possesses great expertise in intra-chaebol
transactions.177 Currently, the KFTC already engages in ad hoc
review of intra-chaebol transactions for fairness, but it does so
without the benefit of strong disclosure rules because the chaebol
are only required to provide one consolidated financial state-
ment of all related firms, with the exception of publicly listed
firms. 178
Of course, the proposed law may burden chaebol firms with
higher terms of finance to the extent that they were able to enjoy
preferential benefits through their NBFI connections, but as this
Article has argued at length, this would precisely be the in-
tended effect.1 79 Furthermore, the increased burden resulting
from the disclosure requirements would certainly be unwelcome
to some, but such enhanced disclosure would likely result in the
gradual reduction of the "Korea discount" and chaebol families
could reap these benefits in future issuances of securities.
1 8 0
Fortunately, the enforcement of the disclosure requirements
would be made easier by the power already possessed by KFTC to
176. As alluded to earlier, Korean law already prohibits chaebol from owning sub-
stantial stakes in commercial banks, on the model of the Bank Holding Act in the
United States, and thus the proposed law would focus on NBFI affiliates.
177. The other obvious candidate is the Financial Supervisory Commission, which
currently exercises jurisdiction over NBFIs. However, the author is of the opinion that
the Fair Trade Commission would be the better option because of its decades of exper-
tise in regulating the chaebol since the Fair Trade Act was promulgated in 1981.
178. See Nam et al., supra note 104, 129.
179. If there are concerns that such a law would amount to "over-regulation" in
Korea, Korean policymakers could consider repealing the Fair Trade Act's limitations
on the use of NBFI voting rights. After all, the entire rationale behind this regulation-
the reduction of the ownership and voting rights gap in the chaebol-is highly unlikely
to be realized through this regulation anyway.
180. See, e.g., Mitton, supra note 8, at 227 (finding that East Asian firms with better
disclosure were valued more highly, particularly during the Asian financial crisis).
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trace the bank accounts of chaebol firms for evidence of illegal
dealings.181 Also, in response to concerns that such a law might
amount to over-regulation, lawmakers could consider repealing
the Fair Trade Act's limitations on the use of NBFI voting rights
as a compensatory measure. As argued above, the main ratio-
nale behind the latter regulation-the reduction of the owner-
ship and voting rights gap in the chaebol-is highly unlikely to be
realized through this regulation anyway. 82
Finally, observers may be skeptical of the effect that the pro-
posed regulations would actually have in reducing the ownership
and voting rights gap observed within the chaebol. After all, when
some chaebol firms post record earnings, the chaebol will be less
reliant on their financial institutions for internal finance due to
solid retained earnings by non-financial firms. This argument
misses the point, however, because any capital that stays within a
business group is capital that is kept out of the market as a
whole, and would thus contribute to the financing advantage of
chaebol firms vis-d-vis other firms.183
At any rate, the main premise of the proposed law is that
economic cycles come and go. Korea will hopefully never have
to go through another economic crisis like the one experienced
in the late 1990s, but economic downturns can and will happen.
Yet when such downturns do happen, some of the weaker chaebol
firms may find that they can weather the storm through their
NBFI connections, when they would otherwise have had to
merge with stronger firms or go bankrupt. The proposed law
intends to rectify this effect, so that the playing field will be more
closely evened for chaebol and non-chaebol firms, and market
forces will be allowed to play their natural role. Thus, if certain
chaebol do in fact invest resources inefficiently, these chaebol will
simply have to bear the consequences as regular firms do.
181. See Assembly Rushes to Pass Antitrust Law Revision, KoREA HERALD, Dec. 10, 2004.
182. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
183. See Almeida & Wolfenzon, supra note 51, at 129-30. At any rate, the size of
such retained earnings must be kept in perspective, and it should be noted that a large
chunk of the cash-flow rights of firms like Samsung Electronics are held by those with
no ties to the family, and is thus not freely transferable to other firms. In the case of
Samsung Electronics, over sixty percent of its equity is owned by non-Korean investors.
See, e.g., Samsung, Ownership Structure, http://www.samsung.com/AboutSAMSUNG/
ELECTRONICSGLOBAL/InvestorRelations/CorporateGovernance/OwnershipStuc-
ture/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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CONCLUSION
The dominance of pyramid structures around the world,
while perhaps not entirely surprising, gives rise to new ways of
thinking about the fundamental problem of shareholder expro-
priation. While the equity structure of pyramids is what enables
controlling shareholders to exercise control over property in
which they have little equity interest, the advantageous terms of
the pyramids' internal capital markets are what increase the
amount of property brought into the pyramid in the first place.
With an understanding of the financing role that pyramid struc-
tures play, solutions can be tailored to reducing the amount of
property that controlling shareholders can expropriate as well as
the incentive for such expropriation. In particular, the ability of
firms to enjoy advantageous terms of finance within the pyramid,
often through subsidization by affiliated financial institutions,
gives them a partial shield against the disciplinary effects of the
market and aids the pyramid in continually expanding in the
face of outside competition. Thus, the adoption and enforce-
ment of a law that reduces this advantage, to the extent that the
advantageous terms of finance result from improper cross-subsi-
dization by financial affiliates, would be a powerful and construc-
tive step in that direction.
To be sure, this Article has not advocated a move away from
concentrated ownership, and in fact, has proposed a solution
that acknowledges the likely perseverance of family ownership
structures. It thus parts with the ideas embraced by those like
Hansmann and Kraakman, who argue that the control of the
business groups worldwide will gradually disseminate to minority
shareholders as product and financial market liberalization grad-
ually weeds out those firms unable to compete amidst these disci-
plining forces.'84 Even if their bold thesis eventually comes true,
there is a dire need for concrete policy measures that can effec-
tively alleviate minority shareholder expropriation at the present
time. The regulations proposed here attempt to fill the current
need by attacking a chief source of the ownership and voting
rights gap exploited by controlling shareholders.
To be sure, it is comforting to know that in countries like
Korea, policymakers have recognized the perverse incentives
184. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History For Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 passim (2001).
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that arise when families are allowed to control financial institu-
tion resources as well as non-financial firms which can be subsi-
dized with them. Yet while they have found the right culprit, the
solutions they have chosen will be of doubtful effectiveness be-
cause they do not decisively address the subsidization benefits
received by chaebol firms through their financial affiliates. While
the sky will not fall if Korea chooses to muddle through with the
status quo, the limits to which the benefits of chaebol organiza-
tion can be derived have already been met. Although the chaebol
will likely remain a mainstay of the Korean economy, the "Korea
discount" and the ability of chaebol firms to reap private benefits
through NBFI affiliations should not. As Korea stands poised to
join the ranks of truly developed economies, its future actions
will hopefully serve as a fitting example for all countries where
such private benefits are derived through pyramidal business
groups.
